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ABSTRACT
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor
against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures
prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time
horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are
typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics
that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in
practice.
If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor
types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is none. The
corporate finance ecosystem evolves at such a rapid pace that interventions
specifically designed to encourage particular types of investors are
increasingly likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive: we are
destined to place our bets on the wrong horse, time and again.
To illustrate the difficulty, this Article briefly sketches the evolution
of three types of shareholders frequently advanced as exemplars based on
their time horizons: major mutual fund groups, activist hedge funds, and
private equity funds. Based on their behavior to date, there is little support
for policies aimed either at favoring or penalizing such investors’
participation in the capital markets generally, and corporate governance
specifically.
INTRODUCTION
The corporate governance literature remains deeply divided over the
impact of investor time horizons on management agency costs and firm
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value. Long-term shareholders are often praised for their incentives to
increase corporate value over the long term;1 their willingness to take into
account the interests of non-shareholder corporate stakeholders (such as
creditors and employees) who may be instrumental to firms’ long-term
growth;2 and their patience—the ability not to be distracted by a firm’s
short-term results, which may be due to chance rather than managerial
performance.3
By contrast, proponents of short-term investing argue that long-term
investors do a comparatively poor job of maximizing firm value.4 Because
long-term investors today are generally institutional, they may suffer from
incentive problems that render them excessively passive vis-à-vis
management.5 Alternatively, they may aggressively advance particular
agendas that are inconsistent with investor wealth maximization.6 For such
critics, the workhorses of the corporate governance world are activist
hedge funds, which relentlessly pursue relatively short-term increases in
firms’ stock prices by appealing directly to management to make changes.
Not surprisingly, then, proposals abound for both regulatory and
private-ordering fixes designed to favor or discourage investors with
particular time horizons. From the long-termist camp, there are proposals
to give long-term shareholders greater weight in voting7 or to allow longterm shareholders privileged rights to make shareholder proposals or
nominate directors.8 Meanwhile, the short-termist camp would limit firms’
ability to defend against activist hedge funds9 and would prohibit dual1. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 570–71 (2016) (summarizing the various arguments in favor of long-tenured
shareholders).
2. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that shareholders should not be given sole control of the
corporation because non-shareholder stakeholders are also essential to firm value).
3. See Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 308–09 (1990) (defining investor impatience as pressuring management
to underinvest in projects with long-term payoffs).
4. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (finding activist interventions tend to increase firm value overall).
5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889 (2013).
6. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796–97 (1993).
7. See, e.g., David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting
and the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295 (2017); Dallas & Barry, supra note 1, at 570.
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112(1) (2017) (permitting Delaware corporations to
condition a shareholder’s right to include its board nominee(s) in the corporation’s own proxy on a
certain minimum duration of share ownership).
9. For example, one could prohibit the use of poison pills to penalize the acquisition of large
share blocks even without the intent to acquire control.
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class and other voting structures that can concentrate voting power in
management.10 Adding fuel to the fire, the debate over investor time
horizons is often merely a cover for the perennial debate over whether
shareholders or managers should have more control over the corporation:
generally speaking, the short-termist camp maps nicely onto the set of
shareholder-rights advocates, while the long-termist camp draws heavily
from corporate managers, their advisors, and scholars in the managerialist
camp.
Yet there is simply no consensus as to whether we should favor longterm investors over short-term investors, or vice versa.11 While long-term
investors appear to be winning in the court of public opinion,12 the
academic literature is simply divided.13 This confused state of affairs is
owed in part to the surprising difficulty of identifying the precise
connection between (1) investors’ time horizon, (2) the time horizon of
firm projects, and (3) the time horizon over which firm value is
maximized. From an efficiency standpoint, most would accept that the
goal is to maximize long-term firm value,14 defined as the discounted sum
of all expected future cash flows of the firm. Yet, there is deep
disagreement as to what project duration is likely to achieve that result,
and what type of investor will most successfully induce management to
adopt such projects.15 Lay discussions frequently conflate the three distinct
inquiries. Critiques of the ill-defined “short-termism” of the financial
markets, for example, frequently imply without proof that short-term
investors prompt firms to favor short-term projects, with the goal of

10. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, 1152–53 (criticizing proposals that diminish voting rights
of short-term shareholders and tighten disclosure requirements of acquiring firms).
11. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE
L.J. 1554, 1574 (2015). Others have argued that the debate should be reframed as the conflict between
current and future investors, rather than between short-term and long-term investors. See Henry T.C.
Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of
Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (1991); Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044
(2005).
12. Leaders of some of the largest U.S. investment fund groups have raised alarms over perceived
short-termism in the markets. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman, Blackrock, Inc., to CEOs
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-gb/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/4BUV-9Z9R]; Letter from F. William McNabb, III, Chairman & CEO, Vanguard
Grp., to the Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard Funds’ Largest Portfolio
Holdings (Feb. 27, 2015), https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/CEO_Letter_03_02_
ext.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VZM-6K2P].
13. See infra Part I.
14. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 754–55 n.139 (2016).
15. See infra Part I.
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maximizing firm value only over the short-term.16 In fact, however, the
connection between these three measures remains largely unresolved, both
theoretically and empirically.
In light of this uncertainty, we lack a solid basis for the various policy
proposals targeting investors with particular time horizons—
notwithstanding the confidence and urgency with which they are typically
advocated. Perhaps firms do best precisely when their investors display a
wide range of time horizons. Because there is no ideal investor, the pushand-pull of investors with competing interests could plausibly produce the
best outcomes, pitting the patience of long-term investors against the
urgency of short-term investors.17 Policies tied to specific investor time
horizons pose a further problem, which is that they are necessarily bets on
the actions of the real-world investors that tend to adopt that horizon.
Privileging or penalizing specific investor time horizons necessarily
means privileging or penalizing specific types of investors. Favoring longterm shareholders over short-term shareholders, for example, would
amount to favoring mutual funds and pension funds over hedge funds.
This game is a risky one to play, given the speed with which the
capital markets and capital-market participants now evolve. The current
debate pays insufficient heed to the fact that the characteristics of any realworld investor type change over time and, arguably, at an accelerating
rate.18 This rapid change significantly lessens our ability to predict the
social-welfare impact of encouraging or discouraging such investors. As a
result, any corporate governance intervention—whether imposed by law
or adopted through private ordering—that is designed to favor one type of
investor over another is problematic and can in fact prove
counterproductive.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly sets the scene for the
investor time-horizon debate, offering a simple framework for situating
16. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE BUSINESS AND SOCIETY PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORTTERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT 2 (Sept. 9, 2009), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/
pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X5P-U5RE] (describing various harms
associated with investor short-termism).
17. Relatedly, Michal Barzuza and Eric Talley posit a helpful symbiosis between the long-term
bias of management and the short-term bias of some investors. See Michal Barzuza & Eric L. Talley,
Short-Termism and Long-Termism (Va. Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 2016; Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2731814, 2016; Columbia Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 14503, 2016; Colum. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 526, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731814.
18. See Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder—Shareholder Power and Shareholder
Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 53 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall
S. Thomas eds., 2015) (arguing that legal doctrine and regulation lag behind the changing profile of
shareholders over time due to the mobility of capital and innovation and globalization in the capital
markets).
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the most common claims and critiquing conventional accounts. Parts II
through IV illustrate the difficulty of betting on investor time horizons by
describing the evolution of three types of investors that have been
variously championed (or reviled) based on their time horizons: mutual
funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity funds. In each case, their
investment practices and impact on firms and governance have changed
repeatedly, often in unexpected ways, and popular and academic
enthusiasm have waxed and waned accordingly. Part V concludes by
highlighting the ironic role that each of these three investors has played in
the ongoing decline in U.S. public companies. Because this decline is not
only unintentional but ultimately harmful to their respective interests, we
might well wonder at the wisdom of relying on any one of them to solve
all of our corporate governance ills.
I. THE SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM DEBATE
To make headway in the debates over “short-termism” and related
policy proposals, one must first disentangle three inquiries that are
frequently conflated: (1) firm value time horizons; (2) firm project time
horizons; and (3) investor time horizons. These are addressed in turn.
A. Firm Value
From the sole perspective of economic efficiency, there is broad
(though certainly not unanimous) agreement that a firm’s management
should seek to maximize what we might refer to as long-term firm value.19
A firm’s long-term value is typically defined as the (discounted) sum of
all cash flows expected to be generated by the firm for the benefit of
investors over all future periods.20 While the formula for calculating longterm firm value is simple, estimating it at any point in time is far less so,
requiring difficult predictions as to both firm-specific and market-wide
measures. Conveniently, however, if the capital markets are
informationally efficient—by which we mean that securities prices
immediately and perfectly reflect all available information—then a firm’s
19. Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 14, at 754–55 n.139. While there is disagreement
over whether the goal of maximizing long-term value should be incorporated into law or remain a
norm, Delaware court opinions occasionally make explicit reference to it when discussing director
fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Virtus Cap. L.P. v. Eastman Chem. Co., C.A. No. 9808-VCL, 2015 WL
580553, at *16 n.5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2015). However, J.B. Heaton argues that Delaware law pays lip
service to the maximization of long-term firm value, when in practice is calls for the maximization of
firm longevity, which may well be in conflict. See J.B. Heaton, The “Long-Term” in Corporate Law,
72 BUS. LAW. 353 (2017).
20. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 82, 94 (11th ed.
2013).
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current market value (which we may refer to as short-term firm value)
should be precisely equal to its expected long-term value.21 Indeed, the
current price of a firm’s shares should be no more and no less than the
market’s estimate of all future cash flows of the firm that will be available
to be paid to shareholders—and likewise with the current price of the
firm’s debt obligations, if any. Management need only look to the
aggregate market value of the firm’s various outstanding securities to
obtain the market’s collective estimate of the firm’s value.
Already we may precisely situate and critique the two competing
views in this debate. First, as we have seen, it is theoretically possible that
long-term and short-term firm value are but one and the same.22 It is not
only possible but also plausible in markets like those for U.S. large-cap
stocks, which are highly competitive and information-rich and thus, more
likely to be efficient. If that is the case, however, then concerns over
investor “short-termism” are entirely misplaced: rather than decry
management’s and investors’ focus on short-term value, we should
encourage it because short-term value is the best estimate of long-term
firm value. Stated differently, in an efficient market, anything that
increases short-term value increases long-term value and vice versa; there
is, therefore, no point in paying heed to anything other than the firm’s
current securities prices.
On the other hand, it is also plausible that short-term and long-term
value do not perfectly overlap, but the case must be made in a precise way.
In order to claim that the focus on short-term value is somehow
problematic, one must necessarily identify one or more informational
inefficiencies in the relevant financial market. The literature to date offers
many potential candidates, including (1) investor cognitive biases;23 (2)
investor liquidity constraints;24 (3) limits to arbitrage;25 (4) agency costs

21. See id. at 328 (noting that in an efficient market, “every security trades at its fundamental
value”). A more precise definition of market efficiency requires only that securities prices offer
unbiased estimates of fundamental value. In other words, securities prices may deviate from
fundamental value in an efficient market, but any such deviations will be randomly distributed.
22. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 122–28 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover
Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 467, 481 (1988) (highlighting the “wholly
false” distinction between present and future firm value).
23. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443
(1997).
24. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 601, 619 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997).
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and cognitive biases in corporate management;26 and (5) agency costs in
investment managers.27 This literature is too lengthy to survey here.28
Suffice it to say that while certain inefficiencies in the capital markets have
been well documented, the extent (if any) to which they create a material
and exploitable wedge between short-term and long-term value remains
largely unknown.
B. Firm Projects
Discussions of investor time horizons are often paired with claims
about the time horizon of firm projects. A common worry, for example, is
that the “short-termism” of the capital markets results in firms shifting
away from long-term projects and investments toward shorter-term
projects. Under pressure from activists, for example, a firm might choose
to jettison its research and development and use the savings to increase
shareholder payout. Even assuming that U.S. firms are shifting toward
shorter-term projects, however, we would need to know more before
concluding that this shift is problematic. Recall that the ultimate goal is
the maximization of firm value over the long term, not the length of firm
projects or the life span of the firm itself. A long-term project is not
preferable to a short-term project (or vice versa) in the abstract; what
matters is how each is expected to contribute to firm value.29
The relevant inquiry is as follows. We can safely assume that for
every firm, there is some mix of feasible projects that would maximize its
expected long-term value, and that this mix may involve projects of
varying time horizons. The relevant questions, then, include (1) what the
value-maximizing (or “efficient”) mix of short-term and long-term
projects is for any firm; (2) whether firms tend to depart from this efficient
mix; and (3) if so, why. Because the first and second questions are so
difficult to answer directly, they are often approached indirectly, for
example, by observing whether firms’ investment mix changes over time
or in response to particular shocks.30
26. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic
Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. ECON. 655 (1989) (providing a model in which management engages
in value-decreasing behavior).
27. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5.
28. For an overview of the various explanations for why short-term and long-term value may
diverge, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 691–708 (2010).
29. As stated, this principle is correct from the perspective of the firm itself. From a socialwelfare standpoint, however, it is likely that certain long-term projects, such as research in basic
science, yield larger positive externalities for society than do short-term projects.
30. See, e.g., Wahal & McConnell, supra note 3, at 320–23 (studying the effects of changes in
institutional ownership on firm R&D expenditures).
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Once again, available studies yield mixed results. The seemingly
tautological question of whether short-term investors cause firms to switch
to short-term projects is unresolved.31 Yet even if short-term investors do
so, is that necessarily harmful to long-term value? The answer is far from
clear. Perhaps in an ideal world, long-term projects tend to contribute more
to firm value than short-term projects, all else being equal. Yet in the real
world of management agency costs, it may be that short-term projects
generate more firm value because they enable investors to better monitor
managers and measure their performance.32 If that is the case, then both
short-term and long-term investors should prefer short-term projects.33
The puzzle remains.
C. Investor Time Horizons
We now return to the inquiry with which we began, namely whether
there is an optimal investor time horizon, and if so, whether we should
adopt policies to promote it. The first point to be made is that the focus
should be on the time horizon of institutional investors, rather than retail
investors.34 The last half-century has seen a seismic shift in investment
channels, with the bulk of retail investors investing through financial
institutions or investment funds.35 As a result, investor holdings have not
only become increasingly institutionalized but also increasingly
concentrated.36 We may therefore assume that institutional investors
primarily determine both securities prices and governance outcomes in
corporate America.
31. For evidence that activist hedge funds (which are considered short-term investors) cause
firms to adopt shorter-term projects, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the
Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016);
YVON ALLAIRE & FRANCOIS DAUPHIN, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGS.,
HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND SOME NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150401_Allaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7B8M-3B6X]. For the contrary view, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 4.
32. See Richard T. Thakor, A Theory of Efficient Short-Termism 2–4 (Aug. 12, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821162.
33. See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 17, at 9 (modeling securities markets where (1) managers
are overconfident, leading them to inefficiently favor long-term projects, and (2) investors are presentbiased, leading them to inefficiently favor short-term projects).
34. “Retail investors” are comprised of individuals and households, whereas “institutional
investors” include organizations like banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and
other investment funds that tend to make large investments. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC,
Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–26
(2009).
35. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (2d ed. 1986).
36. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the AntiCompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872754.
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What, then, do we know about institutional investors’ time horizons
and their effects on long-term firm value? First, the received wisdom about
institutional investor time horizons is often inaccurate. Paradigmatic
“short-term” investors, such as activist hedge funds, are not all that shortterm.37 By contrast, “long-term” investors, such as mutual funds, have
mixed horizons, and by some measures they should be considered
relatively short-term.38 As for how such investors’ time horizons affect
firm value, here again, the easy answer is not necessarily the correct one.
We are often told that short-term investors engage in tactics that boost
short-term value at the expense of long-term value.39 Yet we lack evidence
that this is indeed the case.40 In fact, it can be shown that both short-term
and long-term investors have incentives to occasionally push firms to
engage in value-decreasing behavior.41 Without more convincing
evidence, there is no a priori reason to favor one investor over the other.
To conclude this Part, the theoretical and empirical literatures are
largely unresolved as to whether short-term or long-term investors are
better for firm value. The remaining Parts argue that even if the evidence
favored one time horizon or the other today, it would not follow that we
should adopt policies promoting investors with that time horizon. There
are no ideal investors, only real-world ones. Parts II through IV offer brief
thoughts on three such real-world investor types that are closely associated
with a particular time horizon: mutual funds (which are associated with
long-term investment), activist hedge funds (short-term), and private
equity funds (medium-term). In each case, we find that their behavior and
their impact on firm value and governance have changed remarkably, even
over short periods, making it risky to bet on any particular investor type
37. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731–32 (2008) (finding that the median holding period for activist hedge funds
between 2001 and 2006 was approximately twenty months).
38. See Anne M. Tucker, The Long & The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund
Investment Time Horizons, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
39. See Martin Lipton et al., Taking Short-Termism Seriously: A Response to Charles Nathan,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/13/taking-short-termism-seriously-a-response-to-charlesnathan/ [https://perma.cc/D3HS-G72R] (claiming that “short-termism and activism are significant
contributors to diminished GDP and to economic decline”).
40. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism--In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
BUS. LAW. 977, 1005–06 (2013) (noting the dearth of evidence of short-termism in the financial
markets). Furthermore, theoretical models in which short-term investors affect the behavior of
managers do not necessarily imply discrepancies between short-term value and long-term value. See,
e.g., Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481
(2009) (claiming that short-term “transient” investing by institutional blockholders can increase firm
value); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 148 (1990).
41. See Fried, supra note 11.
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by altering the rules of corporate governance. The dynamics of the capital
markets are such that we do not know (even in the relatively short-term)
what the outcome would be.42
II. LONG-TERM INVESTMENT: MUTUAL FUNDS
Direct retail investors, due to their short-term liquidity needs, their
lack of sophistication, and their small, dispersed holdings, have long
shouldered the blame for two evils in the capital markets: inefficient asset
pricing and poor corporate governance. But direct retail investors are
dwindling: institutional investors currently own close to 70% of the U.S.
stock market,43 up from a mere 6.1% in 1950.44 Thus, the rise of
institutional ownership—particularly by mutual funds—was welcomed in
the early 1990s as a promising solution to the agency costs of corporate
management,45 especially after draconian regulatory barriers to
shareholder communications were removed from the federal securities
laws in 1992.46 With retail investors pooling together into funds, corporate
governance would be left in the hands of a much smaller number of fund
managers, who would presumably have greater incentives and ability to
be more active monitors and to maximize long-term firm value. This
would be so even where individual retail investors entered and exited a
fund in the very short term because the fund itself would maintain the vast
majority of its assets invested in a broad array of firms and would do so
for the foreseeable future. Combining relative sophistication and a longterm investment horizon, mutual fund managers ought to have been the
counterweight to corporate management that shareholders needed.
Indeed, mutual fund complexes are often not only the longest tenured
but also the largest shareholders of U.S. public companies.47 With such
42. Cf. Jennifer G. Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. (2000)
(tracing the many visions of the shareholder, which owe in part to changes in shareholder behavior
over time).
43. Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity:
Trends and Relationships (Wharton Sch. U. Pa., Working Paper, Aug. 21, 2012),
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~keim/research/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_21Aug2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4YG-6QZ6].
44. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 874.
45. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Mark J. Roe,
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
46. See Mark Roe, Free Speech for Shareholders?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1991 (critiquing the
pre-1992 regime under which communications among shareholders were severely restricted).
47. See Posner et al., supra note 36, at 5–6.
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significant holdings, mutual fund complexes have the capacity to exercise
immediate and dramatic interventions in the corporate governance of firms
in their portfolios, such as by (1) removing directors, (2) vetoing mergers
and other management proposals, (3) initiating their own shareholder
proposals, (4) meeting with management, or (5) waging public relations
campaigns.48 Mutual funds’ massive ownership stakes would thus seem to
solve the problem of rational shareholder apathy first identified by Berle
and Means and avoid shareholder collective action problems to boot.49
Yet the 1990s’ burst of optimism surrounding mutual fund
participation in corporate governance proved short-lived. The anticipated
revolution in corporate governance led by mutual funds never fully
materialized. Instead, mutual fund managers quickly came to be viewed as
excessively passive, continually rubber-stamping corporate management
and reluctant to advocate for major change.50 Investment managers have
incentives of their own, after all, and moving from direct shareholdings by
retail investors to indirect holdings through investment funds added new
and different agency costs to the corporate governance calculus.51 Indeed,
the new received wisdom became that mutual funds would rationally
invest little time and expense into monitoring firms for at least three
reasons.
First, mutual fund managers are compensated based on a fixed
percentage of the assets in their funds, rather than on a share of profits,
which substantially dampens their incentives to pursue value-increasing,
but costly, interventions in governance.52 Managers of index funds, whose
inflows have begun vastly outpacing actively managed funds in recent
years,53 have even fewer incentives to intervene because they are judged
solely on their ability to track the relevant market index. Seeking to
“move” the index by expending costly resources on governance (which
are borne solely by the managers and may not be passed on to the funds)
48. But see infra note 56 for restrictions on mutual funds’ active involvement in management.
49. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 71–82, 129–31 (rev. ed. 1967).
50. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887 (finding that only 4.5% of all shareholder proposals
between 2007 and 2009 were proposed by mutual funds).
51. Id. at 865.
52. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 45, at 473–77.
53. See, e.g., Michael C. Macchiarola & Daniel Prezioso, Expanding Alternatives: From
Structured Notes to Structured Funds, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 405, 444 (2017) (“[I]n calendar year 2015
alone, passive index mutual funds and ETFs brought in $365 billion of new money while actively
managed funds suffered net outflows.”); Patrick Keon, Vanguard Group’s Passively Managed Mutual
Funds Dominate Net Inflows for 2016, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://lipperalpha.financial.thomsonreuters.com/2017/01/vanguard-groups-passively-managedmutual-funds-dominate-net-inflows-for-2016/ [https://perma.cc/DB78-JN5W].
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is thus unlikely to be an optimal strategy for them.54 Where index funds
are concerned, moreover, the threat of exit is obviously not credible when
negotiating with corporate management. Second, mutual fund managers
are commonly affiliated with financial institutions that cater to large
corporate clients, or seek to attract their retirement funds, presenting a
conflict of interest with regard to their willingness to critique firm
management.55 Finally, large mutual fund managers that “seek to
influence” management are subject to very heavy disclosure burdens,
which places an upper bound on their involvement.56
Just as shareholder advocates had begun to give up on mutual funds,
however, the landscape shifted yet again. Since 2004, mutual fund
managers have been required to disclose how they vote their shares in
publicly traded corporations.57 Under public pressure to do so, mutual fund
groups have, by two measures, significantly increased their involvement
in corporate governance.58 First, they have ceased voting consistently in
line with corporate management, instead often following the
recommendations of proxy advisory firms hired specifically for this
purpose.59 Second, they have occasionally supported campaigns by hedge
fund activists.60 Given the major mutual fund groups’ shareholdings, an
activist campaign’s success is all but assured once it attracts the mutual
fund groups’ votes.61 This, in turn, dramatically increases the incentives

54. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1050–51 (2007).
55. See id. at 1054–56; Jennifer Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers
to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 101 (2009); see also James D. Cox & John W.
Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 908
(2005) (noting that fund managers are often faced with conflicts regarding “gaining admission as one
of the acceptable vendors of 401K plans for a portfolio company’s employees and confronting a
shareholder-friendly proposal (e.g., separating the position of CEO and board chair) that is opposed
by that portfolio company’s management”).
56. Investment advisers that own or control 10% or more of a firm’s shares and that seek to
influence the control of the corporation are required to file Schedule 13D with the SEC, which calls
for extensive disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2017).
58. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887.
59. For detailed reviews of the relationship between mutual funds and proxy advisory firms, see
Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY
L.J. 869 (2010); James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010); Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas &
Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
1359 (2014).
60. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887–88 (explaining that mutual funds tend to support
activist campaigns that oppose management on anti-takeover measures like declassified boards and
poison pills).
61. Id. at 886, 896.
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for activists to wage campaigns in the first place and to spend more
resources on them.62
Given their vast ownership stakes and their privileged position as
long-term shareholders, should we seek to increase mutual funds’
influence in corporate governance, whether through regulation or private
ordering? Should long-term shareholders be given additional weight in
shareholder voting, for example? Should we ease the remaining regulatory
impediments to mutual funds’ active involvement in governance? What
we know of mutual funds today does not provide a sound basis for such
policies.
First, despite the renewed vigor of mutual funds’ interventions in
governance, for the time being, their involvement remains muted and
idiosyncratic, and their record in governance is mixed.63 As discussed,
their occasional interventions in governance often depend on the prior
efforts of shareholder activists. Yet any policy that favors long-term
investors over short-term investors will reduce the latter’s ability to wage
activist campaigns in the first place, thus potentially (and ironically)
leading to less intervention by mutual funds.
Further, mutual fund complexes routinely engage proxy advisory
firms for recommendations as to how they should vote their shares.64 The
delegation to proxy advisory firms is controversial, however. On the one
hand, such firms specialize in governance issues and can devote significant
time and resources to them. On the other, given that their clients cover the
entire span of public companies, proxy advisory firms generally take a
position on a specific governance issue across the board, rather than
tailoring their recommendations to individual companies. For those who
believe that corporate governance is far from a one-size-fits-all
proposition,65 this approach may be value-decreasing. Increasing the
voting power of mutual funds would also worry those convinced by recent
studies suggesting that cross-ownership by mutual funds leaves open the
possibility for collusion and decreased competition among firms in their
portfolios.66
62. See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 610 (2013) (finding that proxy fights by activist
hedge funds cost approximately $10 million on average).
63. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016).
64. See James D. Cox et al., Quieting the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive
Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1175, 1201 (2016) (noting the influence of proxy
advisory firms in the shareholder voting process).
65. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1818 (2008).
66. See Posner et al., supra note 36.
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Finally, although mutual funds have a long history in the United
States, they continue to evolve in ways that do not make for easy
predictions with respect to corporate governance. In just the last two
decades, mutual funds have experienced major shifts, such as the surge in
indexing (at the expense of active investing);67 the rise of alternative
mutual funds (which make heavy use of derivative instruments and can
even be short-biased);68 and the increase in investments in large private
companies, such as Uber.69 Each of these developments potentially upends
our understanding of mutual fund strategies and incentives.
More broadly, we do not truly know whether investors today are
intervening too much or too little in governance.70 Even if the answer were
“too little,” would greater involvement by mutual funds, in particular, be
value-increasing?
III. SHORT-TERM INVESTMENT: ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS
Complaints about “short-termism” in the financial markets are often
directed at activist hedge funds, the proverbial thorn in corporate
management’s side. While activist shareholders have always existed in a
loose sense, private investment funds specifically organized to affect
decisions in public companies are a new phenomenon—little more than
two decades old. Activist hedge funds acquire non-controlling stakes in
firms’ stock, and then seek to drive up the stock price by advocating for
major changes in corporate operations (e.g., layoffs), strategy (e.g.,
acquisitions or spin-offs), capital structure (e.g., issuing more debt in order
to buy back stock), and corporate governance (e.g., replacing board
members or executives). The critique, at base, is that by increasing shortterm value, the very actions that generate high returns for hedge funds have
negative consequences for long-term value.71 In other words, hedge funds
67. See Robin Wigglesworth, ETFs Are Eating the US Stock Market, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/6dabad28-e19c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a.
68. See Wulf A. Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds, in ELGAR HANDBOOK ON
MUTUAL FUNDS 3 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 (describing
the rise of alternative mutual funds).
69. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-street-portfolios-areinvesting-in-unicorns.html (describing the recent phenomenon of mutual funds investing in private
tech companies).
70. For competing views on whether managers, shareholders, or other corporate stakeholders
should control the corporations, see generally STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
71. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
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can sometimes fool the market in the short run, but they leave companies
with fewer productive assets for the long run.
Yet activist hedge funds have fierce defenders, particularly in the
scholarly literature, where they are frequently viewed as the lone bright
spot in an otherwise dismal corporate governance landscape for U.S.
public companies.72 Proponents point to large-scale studies finding, on
average, positive abnormal returns to shareholders associated with the
announcement of an activist campaign,73 with some evidence of
persistence after the campaign has concluded.74 In other words, other
shareholders appear to welcome activist hedge funds’ interventions, which
in turn suggests that they do yield benefits for shareholders. Should we
therefore mold the law or develop private ordering solutions to promote
hedge fund activism?
The answer is less than clear. These studies’ conclusions are not
universally accepted.75 Separately, studies linking activist campaign
announcements to a boost in share price suggest only that shareholders
gain in expectation from activist campaigns—at least temporarily—but
these studies do not speak conclusively to the effect on firm value as a
whole. Recall that firm value is the aggregate of future cash flows
available to all investors—shareholders and creditors alike. Yet the gains
to shareholders from activist campaigns may be achieved, at least in part,
at the expense of firms’ creditors.76 For example, an activist campaign that
causes management to increase payout to shareholders may
simultaneously lower the value of the firm’s debt securities: with less cash
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–91 (2015) (arguing that “directors are
increasingly vulnerable to pressure from activist investors . . . and that this pressure may logically lead
to strategies that sacrifice long-term performance for short-term shareholder wealth”).
72. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4 (providing evidence that successful hedge fund activist
campaigns lead to increases in firm value); Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2763–64 (2015)
(providing evidence that activist hedge funds improve firm productivity).
73. See Brav et al., supra note 37, at 1730–31; April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188 (2009).
74. See Bebchuk, et al., supra note 4.
75. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value
(Dec. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2693231 (claiming that many of the positive shareholder returns associated with activist campaigns
are merely the result of selection bias because activist funds target underperforming companies, and
that activist campaigns actually result in lower returns as compared to matched peer companies).
76. See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s
Existing Bondholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1737 (2011) (finding that bondholder returns decline
upon the announcement of an activist campaign targeting the firm); Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder
& Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund
Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3318, 3320–21 (2014) (finding that several types of activist
campaigns result in widening loan spreads for the target firm).
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on hand, the firm is more likely to experience financial distress and fail to
make its debt payments.77 This is critical for two reasons.
First, to the extent that activist hedge funds have succeeded thus far
in extracting value from creditors, creditors should be expected to push
back.78 Creditors of large corporations today have already responded to
the rise of hedge fund activism by adopting provisions, such as dead-hand
proxy puts, to penalize firms where activist investors gain board seats over
the objection of creditors.79 While the Delaware courts have proven
skeptical of such devices for the time being,80 both the odds that activist
campaigns will succeed and the gains when they do are likely to decline
as creditors develop new ways to discourage activism.
Second, if creditors are in fact harmed by activist campaigns, then
the proposition that hedge fund activists increase long-term firm value is
subject to challenge, even if we accept the evidence that they tend to
produce gains for shareholders on average. Once again, a firm’s value is
the value of the firm’s equity plus the value of its debt.81 Actions that
increase share value by decreasing debt value therefore have an ambiguous
effect on overall firm value. A one-time transfer of value from creditors to
shareholders may give a large boost to share price but in turn raise the
firm’s cost of capital if it makes it much more difficult for the firm to raise
debt capital in the future.82 On the other hand, the most widely cited study,
which examines activist campaigns between 2001 and 2006, finds that
such campaigns are associated with positive shareholder returns even in
firms with no outstanding debt,83 which would in fact suggest that the
77. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 603.
78. The current state of affairs is similar to the first wave of leveraged buyouts by private equity
funds, in which shareholders seized considerable value from firms’ existing creditors by increasing
the firm’s credit risk through asset substitution, increased leverage, and increased payout. See
generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). For the seminal case involving the extraction of value from
creditors in a leveraged buyout, see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated, 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990). Creditors responded to the widening threat of
LBOs in the 1980s by tightening the covenants in their loan agreements and indentures to effectively
require that they be paid off (or offered to be paid off) in the event of a leveraged buyout.
79. See Sean J. Griffith & Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts, Hedge Fund Activism, and the
Cost of Capital, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2017).
80. Cf. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 307
(Del. Ch. 2009), aff’d, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009).
81. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
82. Of course, the current share price on the market should take into account the firm’s expected
future cost of capital, but the one-shot, immediate transfer of wealth from current creditors to
shareholders may be large enough to offset the longer term negative impact on cost of capital from
shareholders’ perspective.
83. See Brav et al., supra note 37, at 1767 (finding increased shareholder returns even for firms
with no long-term debt).
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benefits of activism do not derive solely from wealth transfers between
creditors and shareholders. Yet the answer to this question may well
change as shareholders’ and creditors’ strategic game unfolds.
Finally, deep skeptics of market efficiency are unlikely to be
convinced by the positive shareholder returns associated with activist
campaigns, likely viewing the study designs as circular. Indeed, it is
unsurprising that activist campaigns overall result in stock price
increases—they would not wage them otherwise. For market efficiency
critics, the real question is whether such short-term stock price increases
actually reflect increases in long-term firm value—something that
examining short-term stock price movements cannot answer for them.
More generally, there is substantial uncertainty over what returns
hedge fund activism will yield in the future and what effect it will have on
firm behavior. Even over their short history, activist funds and the markets
in which they operate have changed significantly. The low-hanging fruit
are gone: companies with obviously underperforming management and
ready fixes to operations or strategy have been picked clean in prior waves
of activism.84 Competition among activist funds has already lowered their
expected returns, and the pervasive threat of activism has succeeded in
changing the behavior of corporate management ex ante,85 even at firms
that have not yet been targeted. While potentially a positive result for
corporate governance, this preemptive effect reduces the opportunities for
activist hedge funds to earn abnormal returns, leaving their future
somewhat in doubt. Competition could also lead activist hedge funds to
engage in riskier strategies or one-time value extractions from creditors
that are far less likely to lead to increases in firm value. Finally, many
firms remain immune to activist campaigns, whether because of their size
or their ownership structure, placing a cap on activism’s impact on
governance.86 For all these reasons, it appears premature to place bets on

84. See generally C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The
Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016) (noting the more
competitive environment for hedge funds, but finding that funds with more established reputations,
greater financial clout, and greater expertise continue to perform well).
85. See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows 1 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 17-062, 2017), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17062_4b0ff13f-2654-475f-bd45-7b1f42bb936a.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4FG-6YPA] (noting that the
costs and benefits of activist tactics “impact any firm that might be targeted by activist shareholders,
not just those that are actually targeted”).
86. See generally Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Frank and Steven’s Excellent
Corporate-Raiding Adventure, ATLANTIC (May 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2017/05/frank-and-stevens-excellent-corporate-raiding-adventure/521436/ [https://perma.cc/
2ES7-4KPZ] (concluding that smaller public companies are highly unlikely to face an activist
campaign).
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a class of investor that has been a material presence in the market for no
more than two decades.87
IV. MEDIUM-TERM INVESTMENT: PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
Ever since Michael Jensen predicted the “eclipse of the public
corporation,” private equity funds have been hailed by many as the ideal
investor to control management agency costs and increase firm value.88 In
contrast to dispersed shareholders of public companies, private equity
funds hold controlling stakes in mature businesses,89 giving them clear
incentives to exert effort to maximize corporate value.90 Although private
equity funds delegate the day-to-day conduct of corporate business to
professional management,91 just as public-company shareholders do, they
engage actively and aggressively in governance. Private equity-owned
corporations have smaller boards that meet more frequently than publiccompany boards;92 managers viewed as underperforming are quickly
replaced; and management is incentivized with the “carrot” of highpowered incentives and the “stick” of a highly-levered capital structure,
which forces the firm to operate leanly and focus closely on cash flows.93
We may think of private equity funds as medium-term investors.
Ironically, private equity funds are both praised and criticized for their
time horizon. On the one hand, private equity funds typically have a term
of ten years, which is likely to be substantially longer than the holding

87. Frank Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER
POWER 99 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (noting that hedge fund activism became
prominent within the past two decades).
88. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989,
at 61.
89. For purposes of this Article, “private equity funds” refer solely to leveraged-buyout funds,
and do not include other related private investment funds, such as venture capital funds.
90. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in
a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 63 (2016) (noting that private equity
firms have more incentives to monitor a corporation’s risks and are better risk managers than public
company boards).
91. See Daniel Ames, The Relation Between Private Ownership of Equity and Executive
Compensation, 13 J. BUS. INQUIRY 81, 84 (2014) (studying a large sample of privately-owned firms
with hired management).
92. See Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Do
LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING
PAPERS VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2008 65, 72 (World
Econ. Forum, 2008), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/pdf/WorldEconomicForumGlobalEconomic
ImpactOfPrivateEquity.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW3Z-B89B].
93. See generally Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219
(2009) (discussing how managers of private-equity-owned firms are compensated).
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period for investments by hedge funds and most retail investors.94 Thus,
private equity funds have, in theory, both the time and the incentives to
make major operational changes in their portfolio companies that increase
long-term value. On the other hand, a private equity fund tends to hold
portfolio companies for significantly less than the fund’s term (5.5 years,
on average95), because it takes time for the fund to identify and acquire
target companies, and then ensure that they are sold well before the end of
the fund’s term.
More importantly, the manner in which private equity fund managers
are compensated creates incentives for them to hold portfolio companies
for as short a time as they can achieve an exit at a large gain. In the typical
structure, the manager does not receive any share of the profit from fund
distributions until the fund has surpassed an 8% “preferred return,” which
is an internal rate of return (IRR) on the capital invested by the fund’s
limited partners.96 All else being equal, the longer that the fund retains
investors’ capital, the lower the fund’s IRR will be, and thus the lower the
manager’s compensation. IRR figures are also the primary means used to
measure and market private equity firms’ performance, as advertised in
their private placement memoranda. Thus, at least for portfolio companies
that will be sold at a large gain, there is a strong incentive for the private
equity fund to sell as quickly as possible—the “quick flip” often
complained about in the press.
If the timeline is short enough, private equity firms can benefit as
much or more from short-term swings in the capital markets (such as an
unusually favorable window for IPOs) than from implementing long-term
strategic plans. Indeed, evidence suggests that at least some of the returns
generated by private equity funds are derived from mere market timing
rather than operational or governance changes.97
Just how well do private equity funds do at maximizing firm value?
By now the answer should come as no surprise: it is largely unclear. There
is some evidence that private equity has generated small net gains in
employment (albeit at the cost of more layoffs), innovation, and

94. See DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: KEY BUSINESS, LEGAL AND
TAX ISSUES 39 (2015), https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/news/2015/pe_fundskey%
20business_legal_tax_issues.pdf.
95. See Amy Or, Average Private Equity Hold Times Drop to 5.5 Years, WALL. ST. J. (June 10,
2015, 4:13 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-timesdrop-to-5-5-years/.
96. See id.
97. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121, 136 (2009).
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productivity, at least over certain periods.98 While the thrust of the finance
literature appears to take a positive view of private equity, there are
considerable obstacles to measuring its effect empirically, most notably
selection effects (i.e., the fact that private equity firms do not pick their
portfolio companies randomly).99
Just as we saw with activist hedge funds, however, increasing
competition among private equity funds has altered their behavior.100
Whether rightly or wrongly, fund sponsors have recently been accused of
shifting their attention away from the difficult task of increasing firm value
toward the much easier approach of extracting value from their own funds
and portfolio companies.101 When given the choice between (1) taking a
dividend of its portfolio company’s available cash—even at the cost of
putting it at high risk of financial distress—and (2) making risky, costly,
and difficult operational changes that may not pay off for years, the former
may occasionally be irresistibly tempting. This is particularly true given
that private equity funds can simply choose to put their portfolio
companies to creditors in bankruptcy, although established fund
managers’ reputational concerns should help constrain such behavior.102
Given fund sponsors’ considerable financial sophistication and their
option-like compensation, it should come as no surprise that their tactics
change constantly in the hunt for returns. Recently, private equity funds
have begun borrowing to fund the equity portion of their portfolio
companies’ purchase price, making their investment even more akin to an

98. See generally Shai Bernstein et al., Private Equity and Industry Performance, 63 MGMT. SCI.
1198 (2017); Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3956
(2014); Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen & Per Strömberg, Private Equity and Long-Run Investment:
The Case of Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 445 (2011).
99. While the returns from private equity appear to have been favorable to investors thus far, the
reliance on self-reporting and the opacity of fee and return calculations make any conclusions in this
regard tentative. Most importantly, we are only interested in the returns to investors that have come
from a true increase in portfolio company value rather than, say, market timing or extraction of value
from other firm stakeholders.
100. See Gillian Tan, Private Equity Follows the Money, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-08-16/advent-is-latest-private-equity-firmfollowing-the-money-into-debt (describing the private equity industry’s surprising diversification
away from the traditional leveraged buyout strategy).
101. In October 2015 and August 2016, the SEC brought actions against two of the largest private
equity firms, Blackstone and Apollo, claiming that they charged more in fees from their funds than
they were entitled to. Apollo Mgmt. V, L.P., File No. 3-17409 (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/ia-4493.pdf [https://perma.cc/W533-YUQD]; Blackstone
Mgmt. Partners L.L.C., File No. 3-16877 (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2015/ia-4219.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JF4-S6ZG].
102. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 115 (2014).
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option and further altering their incentives.103 Separately, the largest
private equity firms now simultaneously manage funds with radically
different investment strategies, in different asset classes, and sometimes
with directly conflicting interests.104 Consider, for example, a sponsor
whose equity fund and credit fund are both invested in the same distressed
portfolio company. The difficulty of pinning down private equity to a
particular time horizon and investment strategy suggests considerable
uncertainty for policies designed to subsidize or restrict its activities.
CONCLUSION
Policy proposals to favor either long-term or short-term investors
appear to have outpaced the theoretical and empirical literatures, which
remain deeply divided as to which, if any, are more likely to help
maximize firm value. Similarly, there is little basis for favoring the major
investors that currently embody long-term, short-term, or medium-term
investing, such as mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity
funds, respectively. Substantial uncertainty persists about the current role
of each in corporate governance, and perhaps more importantly, we have
every reason to believe that the nature, magnitude, and desirability of their
involvement will change significantly over time.
This state of affairs is perhaps best illustrated by pointing out a
glaring irony regarding mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private
equity funds: arguably, their greatest impact on corporate governance is
not only unintentional but in many respects antithetical to their own
business interests. Specifically, each of these three investors has
contributed to the ongoing decline in the number of U.S. public
companies.105 While the causes of this decline are numerous and complex,
there is reason to believe that each of these fund types shares some of the
blame by materially reducing the incentives of U.S. firms to go and remain
public.
How so? First, mutual funds have shifted their investments over the
last two decades toward the largest public companies due to their increased

103. See David Carey, Buyout Firms are Magically—and Legally—Pumping Up Returns,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-13/buyout-firmsare-magically-and-legally-pumping-up-returns.
104. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 51–53 (2009).
105. See Craig Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017) (documenting
the decline in exchange-listing U.S. firms); Xiaohui Gao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663 (2013) (documenting the decline in initial public offerings by
U.S. firms).
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demand for the most liquid securities.106 In turn, this shift likely
contributed to the demise of the small company IPO.107 With smaller firms
increasingly shunning the public markets, the set of U.S. public companies
is simply shrinking.
Second, certain firms may be avoiding the public markets in part to
avoid hedge fund activists.108 While activists’ impact on firm value is
subject to debate, founders and managers’ distaste for activists is not.
While some firms go public today with dual-class voting structures that
help shield them from activists,109 others are simply choosing to go or
remain private, foregoing entirely the benefits of public company status,
such as liquidity.
Finally, private equity funds also contribute to the decline in public
companies. One explanation for this decline is simply that it has become
so much easier for firms to remain private in recent decades.110 This is
partly due to the explosion of capital now available to private firms.111
Private equity funds, among others, figure prominently in this story. They
have been so successful at raising funds that they have helped lower the
cost of equity capital dramatically for private firms, thereby inducing even
some very large firms to remain private.
The painful irony for these three investor groups is that the decline
in public companies, should it persist, is problematic for each of them.
Fewer companies going public eventually means fewer investment
opportunities for mutual funds, which are constrained in their ability to
invest in private firms due to their statutorily-imposed liquidity
requirements. Activist hedge funds currently only target public
companies; their returns depend on being able to enter (buy) and exit (sell)
a target’s stock relatively quickly, a tactic that would not be feasible in
illiquid private company stock. Finally, IPOs have historically been
106. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What Happened in 1998?
The Demise of the Small IPO and the Investing Preferences of Mutual Funds (Ohio St. Pub. Law,
Working Paper No. 328, 2017; Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2718862, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2718862.
107. See id.
108. See Matt Levine, Uber Is Raising More Money from Rich People, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-15/uber-is-raising-more-money-from-rich-people
(noting that private companies today have most of the advantages of public companies, without any of
the disadvantages, including hedge fund activists).
109. See Kristin Lin, The Big Number—Share of IPOs This Year with Dual-Class Stock
Structures, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-number-1439865699
(reporting that the proportion of IPOs with dual-class structures increased from 1% in 2005 to
approximately 14% in 2015).
110. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 448, 466–72 (2017) (tracing the easing of regulatory burdens
on the issuance and trading of private securities).
111. See id. at 467.
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private equity funds’ most profitable means of exiting their portfoliocompany investments. As IPOs decline, it remains unclear whether private
equity funds can make up the returns elsewhere.
It should give us pause that what will perhaps prove to be these three
investors’ longest lasting and most profound effect on corporate
governance has not been the result of their direct interventions, but rather
the indirect, unintended consequences of their behavior. Calls to give
investors more weight in U.S. corporate governance based on their time
horizons should, therefore, be answered with some skepticism. We have
little means of predicting how such investors would respond when put in
the driver’s seat. After all, by contributing to the decline of public
companies, mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity funds
may be quietly undermining their own business models. Who would have
predicted that?

